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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C 20505

Critical Intelligence Problems Committee

4 September 1985
DDW-130

WEEKLY ACTIVITIES AND STATUS REPORT FOR THE DD/ICS--4 September 1985

CIPC Organizational Activities

- The Narcotics Follow-up Report and the Terrorism Study are being prepared for publication and will be forwarded to the print shop today.
- The next CIPC Meeting is tentatively scheduled for 23 September, with BMD as the main agenda item.
- 25X1 • On 30 August the staff discussed [redacted] memorandum on candidate topics for CIPC consideration. All were impressed with the thoughtfulness of the presentation and several members of the staff found some of the topics to have merit. Few doubted the importance of all the topics to policymakers, but there were questions about whether or not the CIPC was the proper forum to examine these issues. (Attachment 1)
- Steve continued his orientation/courtesy calls before departing for a two-week vacation.
- ✓ 25X1 • The PFIB is scheduled to meet on 11 September to discuss BMD. They have requested, through [redacted] that someone knowledgeable of the CIPC-BMD Study be present to discuss the study, as appropriate. [redacted] 25X1
- ✓ 25X1 • Admiral Holloway, Executive Director, Vice President's Task Force on Combatting Terrorism, has requested that we identify someone to serve as a point of contact to assist the Task Force in a review of the work completed by the CIPC on international terrorism, and help them identify which recommended initiatives have been implemented to date. (Attachment

25X1 [redacted]
25X1 [redacted] called me yesterday evening to volunteer for the job.
✓
BMD Follow-up Study: [redacted] 25X1

- The BMD Follow-up Report has been coordinated with the BMD Working Group and is now being prepared for CIPC staff review. It should be on your desk for your review by early next week. Because BMD will be the main topic at the 23 September CIPC Meeting, we plan to forward the study to the CIPC Members by 16 September.

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WEEKLY ACTIVITIES AND STATUS REPORT FOR THE DD/ICS--4 September 1985 (cont.)

25X1 Mobile Missile Study: []

- The study is in final review by the staff, and barring any unforeseen development, we plan to forward it to you by the end of this week. At this point the study recommends that all follow-on arms control studies be done by the ACIS, however, we stand prepared to alter these recommendations pending your decision on signing the joint [] memorandum to the DCI.
- [] has relocated to Florida and Ray has arranged for him to use the SSU vault at the US Readiness Command in Tampa to support his work as Chairman of the Mobile Missile Panel (MMP).
- The COMIREX member of the MMP, [] has completed his rotational assignment with the IC Staff and has been reassigned to the CIA/ACIS. Among his duties in his new position with the ACIS will be to serve as the CIA representative on the MMP.
- Last week Jim attended a two-day symposium on artificial intelligence at Rome Air Development Center in Rome, New York. It was time well spent as it provided basic tutorials on artificial intelligence, expert systems, knowledge engineering, etc., as well as some insights on their application within the Intelligence Community.

25X1 Narcotics Intelligence: []

- The Narcotics Working Group has started its review of narcotics intelligence collection and production [] Collection requirements will be the focus of today's meeting. Representatives from the HUMINT and SIGINT Committees and COMIREX will be in attendance.

25X1 CBW Intelligence: []

- On 30 August Paul attended an NIO/AL sponsored interagency meeting, chaired by State's representative to the former CIPC CBW Subcommittee, on CBW use. Evidence of CBW use, as well as the status of the CBW sample collection and analysis program, were reviewed at the meeting. It was apparent that the use area needs further attention and the A/NIO/AL is considering what can be done to improve the situation.

WEEKLY ACTIVITIES AND STATUS REPORT FOR THE DD/ICS--4 September 1985 (cont.)

- MG David Einsel, USA (Ret) has been appointed NIO at Large for Nuclear Proliferation and Chemical and Biological Warfare. The A/NIO/AL will arrange for General Einsel to receive an informal briefing on the CIPC CBW effort sometime this month.

Miscellaneous

- [] continues his work on refining the Collection Strategy Evaluation Method (CSEM) that is based on the Future Intelligence Requirements Forecast (FIRF). He now is turning his "management overview" briefing on the CSEM-FIRF concept into a short memorandum to be circulated among ICS Office Heads and Committee Chairmen. Additionally, last Wednesday Willie met with OSD/C³I personnel to introduce them to the status and objectives of the CIPC CSEM-FIRF project, and to compare notes with them on a similar, but more limited effort they are attempting to develop on post-SIOP planning. They seemed open to the ideas presented and promised to deliver a candid technical critique of the methodology.

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SUBJECT: Weekly Activities and Status Report for the DD/ICS--(4 September 1985)

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
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DCI/ICS 85-3677

22 August 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Critical Intelligence Problems Committee
FROM: IC Staff Program Monitor
SUBJECT: Candidate Topics for CIPC Consideration

Elise,
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25X1 1. In thinking about what we have said to Congress extolling the virtues of the IC Staff and more particularly the CIPC, I am growing concerned over what CIPC is going "to do for an encore" or more accurately a series of encores. On the one hand, there is a danger of your taking on problems that are too narrow or too mundane to sustain the attention of such a high-level group; whereas, on the other hand, there is the danger of revisiting the same set of problems too many times and losing the drive and sense of purpose that comes from taking on new challenges. Clearly, the best solution is to identify new problems that are obviously of high national significance, and make headway against them by continuing to exploit the CIPC's unique modus operandi.

25X1 2. The purpose of this memorandum is to suggest some candidate problems that, in my judgment, may meet the discriminating standards that the CIPC should set for itself. I am not sure by what process a topic becomes a matter for consideration by the CIPC; so if I am out of order in putting forth this set of candidates, I ask you to excuse my temerity in doing so and accept these suggestions as simply one person's attempt to help the CIPC build upon its record of unique service and accomplishment.

25X1 3. In generating this list, I have taken the view that there is de facto a "critical intelligence problem" if the United States is having substantial difficulty in coping with foreign impacts on its well-being. Such difficulty implies either the need for policy adjustments or greater persuasiveness in winning foreign acceptance of policies already adopted. Foreign intelligence support could be decisive to achieving success in either dimension.

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SUBJECT: Candidate Topics for CIPC Consideration

4. You will find my list to be very diverse; some items may be too narrow for a group with the breadth of purview that the CIPC affords, others may strike you as too broad and beyond the charter of the Intelligence Community. For the latter in particular, I urge upon you the precept that organizations and societies which are incapable of evolving to take on new and different challenges will soon become moribund. More to the point, a governmental bureaucracy in which the constituent organizations "know their places" and stick closely to them will almost certainly lack the essential ferment and tension needed to adapt to a changing world.

5. For the CIPC to address some of the topics suggested below, it will have to fight off accusations of trespass or other transgressions against staked-out turf. The acid test should be proof from those who mount such protests that the problem either doesn't exist or is already well on the way to being solved.

6. Six candidates follow for your consideration:

a. Intelligence Support to Management of the NATO Alliance:

For much of the post World War II period, the United States has had the economic and technological wherewithal to compete militarily with the Soviet Union while holding its own commercially with the Japanese and other advanced industrialized nations. It is now becoming painfully obvious that this double burden has gotten to be more than the U.S. can handle. One element of a possible remedy is to improve our management of the NATO alliance to achieve a much greater return on the total investment being made. (Yes, this has been tried before and failed, but the incentives to succeed were never as great. Furthermore, all the NATO countries have considerable economic slack, so there would be no danger of economic overheating were we to move collectively to beat the Soviets in the production of advanced conventional weapons). If we do nothing, needless duplication is likely to remain rampant across the alliance, and production runs of needed weapons and ancillary equipments will be too small to achieve high efficiencies and bring down unit costs. Finding out how to work more effectively with our friends looms as being more and more important if we are to continue to contain the Soviet threat. Successful intra-NATO negotiations, leading to more effective and efficient use of the alliance's overall economic and technological superiority, may be the essential prerequisite to putting enough pressure on the Soviets to bring them around at the arms-reduction negotiating table.

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SUBJECT: Candidate Topics for CIPC Consideration

The problem before the Intelligence Community, as I see it, is one of adjusting our thinking away from such intense attention to the threats posed by the Soviets and their Warsaw Pact allies toward more emphasis on what we need to know about our own allies in order to be collectively more effective in meeting those threats. If the Community chooses to seriously address this problem, it will probably require considerable rethinking as to priorities and assignments, and the creation of some new mechanisms for coordinating on products and disseminating them to those who would benefit most from their content. This is unlikely to come about without the blessing of upper management; hence, the suggestion of the CIPC as an appropriate forum to accept the problem as one worthy of attention, to solicit and rank concrete suggestions as to how it should be tackled, and to overcome institutional inertia in implementing those suggestions CIPC judges to be meritorious and persuades the DCI to endorse. [REDACTED]

For example, among the things that the Intelligence Community might contribute to improvements in alliance management are economic and political analyses of candidate policy initiatives to aid the Administration in homing in on those that will stand the best chance of winning acceptance across the alliance. Such analyses might well be best produced as joint undertakings between intelligence analysts and those currently or previously serving in DoD and State who have been involved in the inner workings of NATO. From this example, I believe it is easy to see that the mechanisms by which the Community could insert itself more deeply and effectively into this process will require some imagination, creativity, and judicious negotiation with interested and involved parties outside the Community. The benefit of CIPC sponsorship and attention could be critical to a favorable outcome. [REDACTED]

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SUBJECT: Candidate Topics for CIPC Consideration

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c. Intelligence as a Force Multiplier:

Strategic, tactical, and technical intelligence are all potentially force multipliers. We have some largely anecdotal evidence to back up this notion, but we are lacking solid quantitative data and analyses to help decisionmakers allocate resources between intelligence and fighting forces. A multipronged approach to this problem should be undertaken. It should include: a review of the lessons contained in the historical record of warfare; an examination of how recent technical, doctrinal and strategic intelligence has influenced U.S. weapon designs and force compositions and has led to countering doctrinal adjustments; and, a modeling of the modern battlefield through simulations to show the value, for example, of targeting information obtained by intelligence gathering assets and applied to enhance the effectiveness of war fighting forces. For the future oriented parts of the study, some careful structuring will probably be required to avoid needlessly provoking DoD by producing results that can be read as "net assessments."

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SUBJECT: Candidate Topics for CIPC Consideration

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f. Protection of Intellectual Property:

As the United States adapts to the economic trend which includes the shift of many mature manufacturing industries to less-advanced countries with lower labor costs, our livelihood will be increasingly dependent on the sale and licensing of proprietary "intellectual" property. Such property is protected, albeit imperfectly, within our own borders by the copyright, trademark, and patent statutes and enforceable agreements not to disclose trade secrets. However, in many foreign countries, the legal protection of such property, which often can be duplicated for a small fraction of its true value, is much less well developed than for physically tangible economic assets. This situation, if not corrected, could work strongly to the disadvantage of the United States by eroding the market base against which the costs of developing intellectual property can be amortized. It could be reassuring to both Congress and foreign trade policymakers

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SUBJECT: Candidate Topics for CIPC Consideration

25X1 within the Administration to know that the Intelligence Community was working to size the problem and assembling a data base to support negotiations aimed at protecting U.S. intellectual property in all major foreign marketplaces where such protection was found to be deficient. Doing so would be strongly supportive of the US position that economic development will proceed best if foreign environments are kept conducive to private sector initiatives. For our key trading partners, those nations with the potential to become such, or LDCs on the brink of choosing between centrally planned or market based economies, the Intelligence Community might be tasked to provide:

- 25X1 -- A comprehensive review of the degree of legal protection ostensibly afforded to intellectual property and whether there is discrimination against such property if it is of foreign origin.
- 25X1 -- An assessment of extant administrative and other barriers (time delays, unreasonable evidentiary standards, convertibility restrictions impeding compensation, etc.) to the effectiveness of such legal provisions.
- 25X1 -- An estimate of the nature and levels of illicit activity in violation of laws protecting intellectual property, and the extent of official complicity in being party to, condoning, or ignoring such activities.
- 25X1 -- An assessment of what might serve as bargaining leverage that the U.S. could bring to bear to support improvements, e.g., a coupling of improved protection with debt rescheduling or other forms of economic assistance.
- 25X1 -- An analysis of the internal political and economic pressures that would be acting on foreign negotiators.

25X1 The CIPC is an appropriate forum to address the protection of intellectual property because of the problem's non-traditional nature, the management challenge it could pose in terms of interagency coordination, and the gains to had from showcasing the Community's ability to move with the times.


NOTE: This problem is only one of several that could be seized upon to quicken the Community's involvement in factors bearing on the future economic health of the U.S. and its trading partners. It is certainly safe to say that the U.S. trade deficit and the loss of competitiveness by

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SUBJECT: Candidate Topics for CIPC Consideration

U.S. manufacturers will continue to command a great deal of attention on Capitol Hill. It would behoove the Intelligence Community to be less of a sidelines player, and to show its recognition that these are among the central problems of our times. We can and should be more aggressive in assessing foreign influences on the future health of the U.S. economy, and more actively involved in helping policymakers decide how those influences can be shaped and channeled toward greatest benefit to the United States, or least damage, as the case may be. As a nation, we are at a crucial turning point brought about by the sober realization of the limits to which we can extend our generosity as a trading partner with the rest of the world. In order to rekindle broad scale economic growth and avoid degeneration of the current situation into a zero-sum or worse game, we desperately need to understand the true nature of the problem, what it looks like through eyes other than our own, and whether we need new rules or better adherence by all parties to the rules we have. With increasing numbers of Americans in the workforce hurting, and Congress being pressured to do something about it, keeping emotionalism from carrying the day calls for the kind of dispassionate analysis that the Intelligence Community was created to provide.



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Executive Registry

85- 2798/15



OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

WASHINGTON

26 August 1985

The Honorable William J. Casey
Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Director Casey,

As the Vice President explained to you and the other principals on the Task Force on Combatting Terrorism at the first meeting on 25 July 1985, we are charged by NSDD 179 to review and evaluate the effectiveness of current U.S. policy and programs on combatting terrorism. We know that considerable staff work in this area has already been done, and we are aware of the efforts by the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism and the Critical Intelligence Problem Committee subsequent to the issuance of NSDD 138 in April 1985. As part of our evaluation task, we would like to review the comprehensive CIPC papers, and discuss with knowledgeable members of your staff which of the recommended initiatives have been implemented to date. We would also like to review the Intelligence Community's proposed FY 86 counter-terrorism programs. We would appreciate it if you could designate a focal point, perhaps on the Intelligence Community Staff, to help us coordinate our review.

The officer responsible for current program review on the Task Force's working group is Mr. Burton L. Hutchings. If you could nominate a focal point and ask him or her to contact Mr. Hutchings at 395-4950, we will arrange to quickly and securely review the materials available. Thank you for your help.

Sincerely,

Jim Holloway
Adm. James L. Holloway, III
Executive Director
Task Force on Combatting
Terrorism

cc: NIO/CT
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